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The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in December
1948.1 Article II of the Convention defines genocide as the commission
of certain acts with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnic, racial, or religious group.2 The drafters of the Convention seri-
ously considered the possibility of making it applicable to actions against
political groups as well; in fact, a reference to such groups was included
in Article II throughout most of the drafting stage. However, the word
"4political" was deleted from the article near the close of debate on the
Convention as a whole, and as a result its protection does not extend to
political groups.
The drafters' decision not to extend coverage to political groups has
been of little concern in most countries of the world. The Convention
has been ratified by about 100 nations, and the deletion of the word
"political" from Article II does not appear to have been an issue in their
ratification decisions.3 In contrast, the matter has been of great concern
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1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Convention].
2. Article II of the Convention, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280, states:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
3. For a table of the parties to the Convention and of their reservations to and understand-
ings of the document, as well as of objections to those reservations and understandings, see
MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL (Status as of 31
December 1986) at 95-102, U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER.E/5, U.N. Sales No. E.87.V.6 (1987).
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in the United States ever since President Harry S Truman requested the
Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the Convention in June
1949. Critics of the Convention have denounced the deletion of the word
"political" from Article II, insisting that it creates a loophole in the defi-
nition of genocide that could be abused by totalitarian states, especially
the Soviet Union. In brief, the critics argue that the Soviet Union could,
for example, persecute a national group in a way that would probably be
considered genocidal under the terms of the Convention, but evade being
charged with the crime of genocide on the ground that its actions were
undertaken to suppress a political group. To overcome this problem, the
critics have advocated amending Article II to cover political groups.
Although this issue did not prevent the Senate from finally giving its
advice and consent to ratification,4 Senate critics of the Convention did
succeed in passing a sense of the Senate resolution that calls for the
United States to take steps, after becoming a party to the Convention, to
persuade the United Nations to adopt a "political group" amendment.5
The purpose of this article is to examine the arguments advanced on
this issue, and to offer two responses: First, an amendment adding polit-
ical groups is unnecessary to achieve the objectives of the Convention's
critics. Second, an amendment is undesirable because it could undermine
efforts to interpret and apply the Convention. The political group propo-
sal seems to rest on a misunderstanding of the reasons why the drafters
of the Convention decided not to include political groups among those
protected in the first place. It also reflects a curious and probably errone-
ous interpretation of the intentions of the drafters and of the meaning of
the Convention as adopted. All things considered, it would be better to
pursue aggressive enforcement of the Convention as written, and, if nec-
essary, to work toward the development and acceptance of a separate
instrument on what could be called "politicide."
The article is divided into three main parts. Part I examines the basic
considerations that entered into the selection of the groups identified as
objects of protection in Article II of the Convention. Part II presents the
arguments made during the drafting stage regarding the treatment of
political groups, and appraises the rationale of the drafters in deciding
4. See 132 CONG. REC. S1378-79 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986). The resolution of ratification
was adopted by a vote of 83 in favor, 11 against, and 6 not voting. According to this resolu-
tion, the Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification subject to two "reservations," five
"understandings," and a "declaration" stating that "the President will not deposit the instru-
ment of ratification until after the implementing legislation referred to in Article V [of the
Convention] has been enacted." Id. Because this implementing legislation has not been
passed, the United States is still not a party to the Convention.
5. Id. at S1377-78.
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not to include political groups. Part III criticizes the arguments that
have been made in the United States in favor of amending Article II.
I. The Groups Protected: National, Ethnic, Racial, and Religious
The issue of genocide against political groups is of profound impor-
tance precisely because it involves the heart of the Convention-its defi-
nition of genocide. In effect, the critics argue that the Convention's
definition is fundamentally flawed. This argument contains a misunder-
standing of the drafters' motives in deciding not to include political
groups among the objects of protection. In part, the problem the drafters
faced in this regard can be traced to the early efforts to define genocide,
which were marked by vagueness and inconsistency.
A. Early Efforts to Define Genocide
The Polish scholar and attorney Raphael Lemkin coined the word "ge-
nocide" in 1944.6 He derived the term from a combination of the Greek
word "genos," which means "race" or "tribe," and the Latin root "cide,"
which means "killing." In his actual definition of the term, however,
Lemkin liberally used the words "nations" and "national groups" rather
than "races" or "tribes," and he stated that genocide meant not only the
"immediate destruction" of such groups but also efforts to destroy them
over time by attacking such things as their political and social institu-
tions, culture, national feelings, religion, and language.
7
The first U.N. resolution on the subject, Resolution 96(I), passed in
1946, also contained vague and even contradictory statements. It stated
that genocide is "a denial of the right of existence of entire human
groups," and referred to past instances of genocide when groups had
been destroyed "entirely or in part." Moreover, it failed, as Lemkin had,
to delineate clearly the kinds of groups that had been or could become
victims of genocide. In this connection, the resolution referred only to
"racial, religious, political and other groups."8
B. The Groups Protected
Whatever its shortcomings, Resolution 96(I) established the basic
guidelines within which the Convention was to be drafted. Its provisions
were frequently invoked in the two committees that did the most impor-
6. See R. LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79 (1944).
7. Id.
8. G.A. Res. 96(I), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188-89 (1947). The resolution is also re-




tant work on the Convention: the Ad Hoc Committee of the Economic
and Social Council ("Ad Hoc Committee"),9 and the Sixth (Legal) Com-
mittee of the General Assembly ("Sixth Committee"). 10 In both commit-
tees, different views were expressed on precisely what kinds of groups
should be identified for protection in Article II. The only category not
expressly mentioned in Resolution 96(I) was national groups, but there
seems never to have been any doubt during the drafting stage that such
groups should be included in Article II, as the matter was never really
discussed. Ironically, both committees agreed that "national" groups-
not included in Resolution 96(I)-should be included in Article II.
The inclusion of other groups, however, was more controversial. Some
representatives questioned whether both racial and ethnic groups should
be identified in Article II, arguing that those terms meant essentially the
same thing.11 The same criticism was directed at the terms "ethnic" and
"national." Ultimately, the word "ethnic" was retained upon the insis-
tence of the Swedish delegation, which wanted to maintain a distinction
between these last two concepts.12 Perhaps the most serious disagree-
ment occurred over religious groups. The Soviet representative argued
that genocide against a religious group appeared always to be closely
linked to genocide against a national group, thus implying that religious
groups should be considered subgroups of national groups.13 Other rep-
resentatives, however, especially in the Sixth Committee, took strong ex-
ception to this view and argued that there could be-and had been-
cases of genocide against religious groups within a single nation. 14 In the
end, the Soviet position on religious groups was dismissed by virtually
everyone present.1 5
It is noteworthy that the drafters, having agreed upon the groups that
were to be identified in Article II, decided merely to enumerate them and
9. The Ad Hoc Committee consisted of representatives of seven states: China, France,
Lebanon, Poland, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Venezuela. The committee's report
is contained in Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, 3 U.N. ESCOR Supp. 6, U.N.
Doe. E/794 (1948) [hereinafter Report of the Ad Hoc Committee].
10. The Sixth Legal Committee was comprised of 58 countries. The members are listed in
Table I, infra page 277; see 3 U.N. GAOR C. 6 at xiv-xx, U.N. Doe. A/633 (1948). The Ad
Hoc Committee initially prepared the draft of the Convention; it was subsequently revised by
the Sixth Committee before it was adopted by the General Assembly.
11. See 3 U.N. GAOR C.6 (75th mtg.) at 115-16, U.N. Doe. A/633 (1948).
12. Id. at 98.
13. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 9, at 6.
14. 3 U.N. GAOR C.6 (75th mtg.) at 116-17, U.N. Doc. A/633 (1948).
15. Id. at 117 (vote of 40 to 5, one abstaining, against including "religious" in parentheses
after "national").
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not to define them in any detail.16 Defining the groups more precisely
was presumably left to the implementing legislation which parties to the
Convention are to adopt in accordance with Article V. 17 Thus party-
states are left significant discretion. A U.N. study of this matter shows
that states that have ratified the Convention have defined the protected
groups in different ways, and it is reasonable to expect that others that
have not yet ratified will follow suit.18 Thus, the definitions adopted by
Canada,19 for example, are not exactly the same as those proposed in
implementing legislation submitted to Congress by the Nixon and Carter
Administrations when they attempted to secure the Senate's advice and
consent to ratification. 20 Because different states have varying definitions
of protected groups, problems could arise in interpreting and applying
the Convention. While it is arguable that any difficulties arising from
definitional differences could be resolved by the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ") in accordance with Article IX of the Convention, no dis-
pute involving the Convention has yet reached the ICJ.21
Despite potential definitional problems, it is probably just as well that
no effort was made to define the groups more precisely in the Convention
itself. It is unlikely that acceptable definitions could have been agreed
upon. The word "national," for example, seems to have acquired a
meaning synonymous with citizenship in a state or country, regardless of
its original meaning. The word "ethnic," in common usage, tends to re-
16. In principle, drafting international agreements always entails a choice between mere
enumeration and detailed definitions. For a discussion of the relative advantages and disad-
vantages of each approach, see A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 17-18 (1963).
17. Article V of the Convention, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280, states:
The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Consti-
tutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention
and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or of any of
the other acts enumerated in Article III.
18. See COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, U.N. ECONOMIC & SOCIAL COUNCIL, STUDY
OF THE QUESTION OF THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE 45,
140-53, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/416 (1978) [hereinafter COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS].
This study also shows that even if Article V of the Convention, see supra note 17, is interpreted
as requiring the parties to adopt implementing legislation (which the Special Rapporteur of the
study insists is the correct interpretation), some of them have not yet done so.
19. CAN. REV. STAT. Ist Supp. 171-81 (1970).
20. The same legislation was submitted by both administrations. See S. ExEc. REP. No.
23, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 33-38 (1976).
21. Article IX of the Convention, 78 U.N.T.S. at 282, states:
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or
fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a
State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be submit-
ted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.
Article IX contemplates an important role for the ICY. The article may only be invoked,
however, in the event of a "dispute" concerning the interpretation of the Convention. In addi-
tion, many ratifying states have included reservations to Article IX. The U.S. resolution of




fer to a group of people distinguished by certain cultural and linguistic
characteristics. The word "racial" tends to be associated with physical
characteristics of a people such as color of skin. But surely one should
expect that different definitions could be put forth, that the words could
have different meanings (or perhaps no meaning) in different cultural
contexts, and that it could be difficult to translate these words from one
language to another. By way of example, one hears frequently of the
Soviet Union's treatment of national minorities and of Soviet nationality
policies. The word "national" in such cases refers to Ukrainians, Georgi-
ans, and so forth, not to the citizens of the Soviet Union as a whole.
The lack of specific content does not mean, of course, that the words
used to identify the groups in Article II of the Convention are meaning-
less, but rather that the drafters saw the need for some flexibility in defin-
ing them. They therefore left more concrete definition to future
determination, through such means as the implementing legislation
adopted by the various parties. Although the drafters did not define in
detail the protected groups, it is clear that they intended to extend pro-
tection to stable groups only-to groups having an enduring identity.
This decision makes sense, given the historical context in which the
drafters were operating. The Convention was obviously drafted in re-
sponse to atrocities committed against the Jews and other groups by the
Nazis during World War II. As adopted, Article II would surely apply
to such a situation, whether Jews would be considered a religious, ethnic,
or even racial or national group. Similarly, the Convention would cover
the Armenian genocide-whether one sees Armenians as an ethnic, na-
tional, or religious group.
II. Why Political Groups Are Not Protected
Although the drafters of the Convention reached agreement relatively
easily on most of the groups eventually identified in Article II, discord
arose with respect to political groups. The issue consumed a vast amount
of the time of both the Ad Hoc Committee and the Sixth Committee.
22
While the arguments advanced in each body were essentially the same,
the Ad Hoc Committee voted four to three for inclusion of political
groups in their draft convention,23 while the Sixth Committee voted
against inclusion.24
22. See, e.g., 3 U.N. GAOR C.6 (69th through 74th mtgs.) at 54-109, U.N. Docs. A/594
& A/633 (1948).
23. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 9, at 5.
24. See N. ROBINSON, supra note 8, at 59.
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A. The Arguments Against Protecting Political Groups
Four different arguments were advanced in these debates against in-
cluding political groups in Article II. Of these, two appear to have been
of little importance as far as the ultimate decision was concerned. One
was the position of the Soviet representative, which rested on allegedly
scientific grounds. He argued that the word "genocide" referred to the
destruction of races or nations, and that therefore to include political
groups in Article II would have the effect of expanding the meaning of
the term beyond "the fundamental notion of genocide recognized by sci-
ence."25 But like the Soviet argument on religious groups discussed
above,26 this position was disregarded by the great majority of represent-
atives of other states.2 7 This point deserves emphasis because, as ex-
plained in Section III below, the U.S. delegation to the United Nations
has often been vilified for having capitulated to the Soviet delegation on
the question of including political groups.
A second argument, which several representatives made, was that the
protection of political groups ought to be considered in the broader con-
text of human rights rather than the narrower one of genocide, and that
the Human Rights Commission therefore seemed like the more appropri-
ate body in which to discuss the issue.28 But this argument seems to have
been introduced more as an afterthought-as a convenient way of avoid-
ing an issue full of conceptual and political difficulties.
Two other arguments were of much greater consequence and were
dealt with at much greater length by the drafters of the Convention. One
had to do with a perceived lack of stability or permanence of political
groups. This issue was vigorously and repeatedly raised by a number of
Third World states. The representatives of Venezuela, Iran, Egypt, and
Uruguay on the Sixth Committee were especially outspoken in this re-
gard. They argued that political groups were different in kind from na-
tional, ethnic, racial, and religious groups, since persons tend to be born
into the latter groups, or at least the membership of these groups does
not change over, relatively long periods of time. Political groups, on the
other hand, were not perceived to possess such stability or permanence.
Finally, some representatives opposed including political groups in Ar-
ticle II out of concern that disputes over their inclusion might jeopardize
support for the Convention itself in many states. Some drafters of the
Convention felt that their governments might find it necessary to take
25. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 9, at 6.
26. See supra text accompanying note 13.
27. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 9, at 6.




action against subversive elements. Many representatives on the Sixth
Committee, noting that the draft Convention contemplated the creation
of an international criminal court, feared that if political groups were
included, their governments might be reluctant to ratify the Convention.
As the Venezuelan representative stated:
The inclusion of political groups might endanger the future of the con-
vention because many States would be unwilling to ratify it, fearing the
possibility of being called before an international tribunal to answer charges
made against them, even if those charges were without foundation.
Subversive elements might make use of the convention to weaken the
attempts of their own Government to suppress them... [While] certain
countries where civic spirit was highly developed and the political struggle
fought through electoral laws would favor the inclusion of political groups,
... there were countries where the population was still developing and
where political struggle was very violent. Those countries would obviously
not favour the inclusion of political groups in the convention.29
B. Arguments in Favor of Protecting Political Groups
The views summarized above were widely held, but the U.S. represen-
tative took a strong stand in favor of including political groups in Article
II. This had the effect of prolonging the negotiations until he was willing
to compromise. His position was based on three considerations. He ar-
gued that in practice many states defined political groups in their na-
tional legislation and decrees-for example, by banning political parties
or by establishing a certain party as the only legal party of the state.
Hence, he insisted, it could not be maintained that political groups were
impossible to define. He also took issue with those concerned that in-
cluding political groups would hinder the ability of governments to take
action against groups involved in subversive activities. In this connection
he argued that groups of various sorts, not only political groups, could
engage in subversive activities. Finally, he invoked Resolution 96(I), in
which the General Assembly declared that political groups had been vic-
tims of genocide, and he maintained that failing to follow through on
that earlier statement could weaken the credibility of the United Na-
tions.30 Representatives of several states supported the U.S. position on
political groups. An Ecuadoran delegate, for example, observed that
29. Id. at 58.
30. Transcript of the debate setting forth the position of the U.S. representative can be
found at 3 U.N. GAOR C.6 (74th mtg.) at 101-03, U.N. Doe. A/633 (1948).
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"public opinion would not understand it if the United Nations no longer
condemned in 1948 what it had condemned in 1946. '' 31
C. Resolution of the Issue
The debate among the representatives on the Sixth Committee over the
issue of including political groups was lively and prolonged, and resulted
in a vote of twenty-nine in favor, thirteen against, and nine abstentions.
At the time, one-half of the membership of the United Nations supported
the U.S. proposal. But as Table I shows, there was substantial disagree-
ment within the three largest groupings of states (Asia, the Americas,
and Europe) on the issues of the alleged lack of stability of political
groups and the possibility of those groups engaging in subversive activi-
ties. Still, the measure carried.
Table 132
Vote in the Sixth Committee on Political Groups
(First Vote: Include Political Groups)
Count
(% of area
Area votes cast) Yes Abstain No No Vote Total
Africa 0 2 1 1 4
(0) (50.0) (25.0) (25.0)
Asia 8 3 1 1 13
(61.5) (23.1) (7.7) (7.7)
Oceania 2 0 0 0 2
(100.0) (0) (0) (0)
Americas 10 2 5 5 22
(45.5) (9.1) (22.7) (22.7)
Europe 9 2 6 0 17
(52.9) (11.8) (35.3) (0)
Column 29 9 13 7 58
Total (50.0) (15.5) (22.4) (12.1) (100.0)
31. Id. at 101.
32. The data on which this table is based were made available by the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data were originally collected by the
International Relations Archive and are available on tape. Neither the original collector of the
data nor the Consortium bears any responsibility for analyses or interpretations presented
here. Figures may not add to exactly 100, due to rounding.
The areas referred to in the left-hand column consist of the following countries-Africa:
Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, South Africa (6.9% of the total votes); Asia: Aghanistan, Burma,
China, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Syria,
Yemen (22.4%); Europe: Belgium, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France,
Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, Ukrainian
SSR, the Soviet Union, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia (29.3%); Americas: Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
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In view of the long debate that occurred over the issue, the vote in
favor of including the reference to political groups in Article II suggests
that the arguments made by the U.S. representative were persuasive.
The decision continued to be controversial, however, throughout the ne-
gotiations on other provisions of the Convention. Indeed, the inclusion
of political groups in Article II appears to have been the subject of the
most serious disagreement during the drafting process. Near the close of
debate on the Convention as a whole, the issue was taken up again by
representatives of Iran, Uruguay, and Egypt, who proposed that political
groups be deleted from Article II.33 Speaking in favor of this proposal,
the Egyptian delegate noted that as the discussion in the Sixth Commit-
tee proceeded, it had become clear that the inclusion of political groups
in Article II would be a serious obstacle to ratification of the Convention
by a large number of states.
At this point, the U.S. representative took what he considered to be a
"conciliatory" position, accepting the deletion of political groups from
Article II in exchange for a provision in Article VI that contemplated the
creation of an international criminal court.3 4 The United States had sup-
ported the creation of an international criminal court throughout the ne-
gotiations, and the Ad Hoe Committee's proposal included the
establishment of such a court.35 This provision, however, was deleted by
the Sixth Committee.36 A number of states voiced strong opposition to
the international criminal court in the Sixth Committee. Some were con-
cerned about the ability of political groups to bring unfounded charges
against them before the international body.37 The Soviet Union ex-
pressed doubts about the appropriateness of the international criminal
court's jurisdiction.38
Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the
United States, Uruguay, Venezuela (37.9%); Oceania: Australia, New Zealand (3.4%).
33. 3 U.N. GAOR C.6 (128th mtg.) at 659-61, U.N. Doe. A/633 (1948).
34. Article VI of the Convention states:
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III [i.e.,
conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt
to commit genocide, or complicity in genocide] shall be tried by a competent tribunal of
the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal
tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall
have accepted its jurisdiction.
78 U.N.T.S. at 282.
35. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 9, at 11-12.
36. 3 U.N. GAOR C.6 (49th mtg.) at 407, U.N. Doc A/633 (1948).
37. See supra text accompanying note 29.
38. The Soviet Union indicated that it "was still of the opinion that genocide was within
the province of the competent national tribunals alone, since the right of those who had been
victims of genocide to undertake the punishment of the perpetrators of that crime must be
safeguarded." 3 U.N. GAOR C.6 (128th mtg.) at 670, U.N. Doe. A/633 (1948).
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While the U.S. representative continued to maintain that political
groups should be covered by Article II, he had come to recognize that
the need to attract the largest possible number of parties to the Conven-
tion might be more important than including all the provisions that he
believed should be included.39 Many delegates had expressed serious
concern that the inclusion of political groups in Article II might make it
impossible to secure ratification of the Convention in their own countries.
In the view of the United States, it seemed wise to delete the political
groups clause, particularly if the Sixth Committee delegates previously
opposed would be willing to reconsider their earlier rejection of the pro-
vision regarding an international criminal court. This compromise
proved acceptable to a large number of delegates and was considered
quite significant, although the court has never been created.
Once the United States agreed to support the exclusion of political
groups, the Sixth Committee deleted the reference to them from Article
II. As Table II shows, however, in this second consideration of the issue,
the number of states not voting doubled, to approximately one-third of
the U.N. membership at the time. The number of states abstaining also
increased. Thus, while only six member states (Burma, Chile, China,
Ecuador, Netherlands, and Philippines) felt strongly enough about the
issue to vote against excluding political groups, the U.S. proposal was
adopted with a majority of member states either abstaining or not voting
on the issue. The Soviet Union and its handful of consistent supporters
(Byelorussian SSR, Ukrainian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugo-
slavia) abstained, apparently to indicate displeasure with the interna-
tional criminal court compromise forged by the U.S. delegation.





Vote in the Sixth Committee on Political Groups
(Second Vote: Exclude Political Groups)
Count
(% of area
Area votes cast) Yes Abstain No No Vote Total
Africa 2 0 0 2 4
(50.0) (0) (0) (50.0)
Asia 5 0 3 5 13
(38.5) (0) (23.1) (38.5)
Oceania 1 1 0 0 2
(50.0) (50.0) (0) (0)
Americas 10 1 2 9 22
(45.5) (4.5) (9.1) (40.9)
Europe 4 10 1 2 17
(23.5) (58.8) (5.9) (11.8)
Column 22 12 6 18 58
Total (37.9) (20.7) (10.3) (31.0) (100.0)
It would be fair to say, then, that political groups fell victim to two
major considerations when the Convention was drafted. First, there
were practical political considerations. The United States could have its
own way on political groups or an international criminal court, but not
on both. In the end it took the court. Second, there were theoretical
considerations. Political groups were widely perceived to be different in
kind from national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups; the latter were
perceived as stable groups whereas political groups were perceived as es-
sentially unstable, since membership in political groups is by choice
rather than birth, and such membership can change drastically over time.
III. The Proposed United States Amendment On Political Groups
Ironically, while the United States agreed to the deletion of the refer-
ence to political groups in Article II in part to remove an obstacle to the
Convention's ratification by other states, the decision to delete caused
problems in the U.S. Senate. President Truman transmitted the Conven-
tion to the Senate in 1949 with a request for its advice and consent to
ratification. A subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations
held hearings on the Convention in 1950, and although the subcommittee
favored ratification, the full committee failed to report the Convention to
40. The source of the data for Table II is the same as Table I. See supra note 32.
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the Senate.41 President Truman's request met with the combined opposi-
tion of conservative senators and influential organizations such as the
American Bar Association. As a result, the Convention languished in
committee until President Nixon resurrected it in the early 1970s. The
Committee on Foreign Relations or subcommittees thereof held hearings
on the Convention in 1970, 1971, and 1977,42 and recommended its rati-
fication in 1970, 1971, 1973, and 1976. 43 The same combination of polit-
ical forces, however, continued to block ratification. A resolution of
ratification was debated on the floor only once during this entire period,
in 1974, and at that time a filibuster prevented its adoption. 44 The Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations held more hearings during the Reagan Ad-
ministration, in 1981, 1984, and 1985. 45 These hearings culminated in
the February 1986 adoption of a resolution of ratification, known infor-
mally as the Lugar-Helms-Hatch Sovereignty Package. 46
Throughout this entire period, the so-called "political group exemp-
tion" plagued the Senate debates over ratification of the Convention. It
was not the only controversial issue, but it was one of the most impor-
tant. Other difficult issues proved easier to resolve. One such issue, im-
portant especially to conservative senators, was the general argument
that genocide is not a proper subject of the treaty-making power, and
more specifically, that the Convention itself contained provisions that
would infringe on constitutional rights and liberties. 47 Another had to
41. See Hearings on the Genocide Convention: Hearings on the International Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950). Portions of these hearings were not
released until 1976, when they appeared in a compilation of historical sessions. See 2 EXECU-
TIVE SESSIONS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITEE, HISTORICAL SERIES 361,
375 (1976).
42. Genocide Convention: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Genocide Convention of
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Senate
Hearings]; Genocide Convention: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Genocide Convention
of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter 1971 Senate
Hearings]; Genocide Convention: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Senate Hearings].
43. For the resolution of ratification that was recommended in each of those years, see S.
EXEC. REP. No. 50, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1984).
44. 120 CONG. REc. 2202-09 (1974).
45. The Genocide Convention: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Senate Hearings]; Genocide Convention: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter 1984
Senate Hearings]; Crime of Genocide: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Senate Hearings].
46. See 132 CONG. REc. S1377-78 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986).
47. Senator Sam Ervin, Jr. was especially outspoken on this point. In more recent years,
Senators Jesse Helms, Strom Thurmond, and Orrin Hatch have held this position. See 1984
Senate Hearings, supra note 45, at 4-34. The Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate




do with the possible application of the Convention in times of war, an
issue of great concern during the early 1970s, when some opponents of
ratification became alarmed that American soldiers fighting in Vietnam
might be charged with committing genocide.4 8 During the early 1980s,
the International Court of Justice's handling of the case of Nicaragua v.
United States49 raised a new issue: whether the United States should
accept Article IX of the Convention,50 providing for ICJ resolution of
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Conven-
tion.51 Ultimately, these and other issues were "resolved" in the Lugar-
Helms-Hatch Sovereignty Package, which included U.S. interpretations
of certain provisions of the Convention and expressed reservations to the
document.
52
The alleged loophole involving political groups, however, could not be
addressed in the Sovereignty Package. This resolution clarified specific
words, phrases, or provisions contained in the Convention, whereas the
supposed loophole exists because the word "political" was deleted from
Article II of the Convention. Another way had to be found to address
the issue. One proposal, advanced by Senator Steven Symms, was for the
Senate to amend Article II of the Convention by inserting the word
"political" after the word "national." This proposal was rejected by a
vote of sixty-two against, thirty-one in favor, and seven not voting,
53
mainly because it was thought to be a "killer" amendment requiring re-
negotiation of the Convention prior to U.S. ratification.54 The Senate
then overwhelmingly adopted a compromise: a sense of the Senate reso-
lution calling for the United States to work toward persuading the
United Nations to include political groups in Article II. This resolution
was adopted by a vote of ninety-three in favor, one against, and six not
voting.55
Constitutional Issues Relating to the Proposed Genocide Convention: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
48. An article on this charge was carried by the New York Times on November 26, 1969,
at A10, col. 1, and it figured prominently in the Senate deliberations in the early 1970s. The
-text of the article is reprinted in 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 53.
49. 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26, 1984). In the Nicaragua case, the United States
withdrew its consent to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ after the court agreed to rule on
Nicaraguan charges of U.S. violation of international law.
50. See supra note 21.
51. See comments of Senator Richard Lugar in 1985 Senate Hearings, supra note 45, at 2.
52. See 132 CONG R c. S1377-78 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986).
53. Id. at S1361-62.
54. Senator Richard Lugar, then Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, thought
that an amendment would be "tantamount to rejection" of the Convention. Id. at S1357.
Senator Symms was well aware of the implications of his proposal. See id. at S1356-57.
55. Id. at S1379-80. The only negative vote was cast by Senator Barry Goldwater, who
neither participated in the debate nor gave any reasons for his vote.
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The resolution is non-binding, and was adopted amidst substantial
skepticism about its potential effectiveness. 56 Some senators voted in
favor of the resolution even though they disagreed with its content and
rationale. Senator Christopher Dodd, for example, remarked on the
floor of the Senate several days after the adoption of the resolution that
he had voted in favor of it as "a ransom to be paid for getting a final vote
on the Genocide Convention." T57 In fact, he had serious reservations
about the content and implications of the resolution, suggesting that
"anyone who talks about political genocide has missed the whole point of
the Genocide Convention and its 37 years [sic] history."'5 8 Nonetheless,
even if the near unanimous vote does not reflect the true sentiment of all
senators, the non-binding resolution is important inasmuch as it reflects
the strong feelings of many senators on the issue. After all, the more
drastic proposal introduced by Senator Symms to amend the Convention
was supported by thirty-one Senators. Of those who opposed the Symms
proposal, some felt that an amendment was not an appropriate way to
approach the issue, even though they did not disapprove of the idea in
principle. Moreover, President Reagan endorsed the strategy enunciated
in the sense of the Senate resolution even before its adoption,5 9 which
suggests that the issue is considered important by the Executive Branch
as well. In short, even if the United Nations does not accede to the
United States' wishes by amending the Convention to cover political
groups, there is substantial support in the United States for keeping the
issue alive. Thus, it is important to examine the arguments made by crit-
ics of the Convention.
A. The Lack of Leadership by the U.S. Delegation
The first point critics have focused on is the fact that the U.S. delega-
tion to the United Nations initially vigorously supported the inclusion of
political groups in Article II and then changed its position to allow their
deletion from the article. To opponents of ratification, this change of
stance reflected not leadership in drafting the Convention but "a very
pathetic case of followership."' 6 This was one of the major arguments of
the ABA, which officially opposed ratification of the Convention from
1949 until 1976. ABA representatives asserted that the U.S. delegation
"retreated at every major point.., like Napoleon's retreat from Mos-
56. See id. at S1379 (statement of Senator Wallop).
57. 132 CONG. REc. S1613 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1986).
58. Id.
59. See 132 CONG. REc. S1372 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986).
60. 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 54.
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cow-a complete rout."' 61 Thus, while the United States had entered
into the negotiations with the intention of making the Convention
"meaningful and effective,"' 62 "[w]e lost the war when we acceded to the
adamant Communist position, which is all a matter of record, that the
word 'political' must go out, and we fought and we fought, and we were
outvoted on the question of political groups."
'63
Although the ABA representatives claimed to speak with considerable
knowledge of the negotiations, their arguments distorted and exaggerated
what actually occurred. For the most part, they portrayed the negotia-
tions as a battle in which the U.S. delegation was unable to withstand the
onslaught of a determined Communist attack.64 But, as we have seen,
this was not the case: while the Soviet delegation opposed the inclusion
of political groups in Article II, other delegations advanced much more
widely accepted criticisms, especially those that concerned the alleged
lack of stability of political groups. Moreover, there is good reason to
think that the Soviet delegation felt outmaneuvered by the U.S. delega-
tion on the eventual compromise. As noted earlier,65 the Soviet Union
and its supporters abstained on the vote that resulted in the deletion of
political groups from Article II. It is reasonable to assume that this was
meant to show displeasure with the compromise the U.S. delegation had
been able to work out with others-that the reference to political groups
would be deleted in exchange for a provision in Article VI regarding the
creation of an international criminal court. While the Soviet delegation
vigorously opposed the inclusion of political groups in Article II, it was
an even more vigorous champion of sovereignty and nonintervention in
the internal affairs of states. For this reason, apparently, the Soviet
Union was not willing to support the creation of an international crimi-
nal court,66 and opposed, though unsuccessfully, the reinsertion of a pro-
vision concerning the court in Article VI.67
Critics of the Convention in the United States have either misunder-
stood the bargaining strategies of the U.S. delegation or deliberately dis-
torted what occurred to suit their own purposes. Indeed, one of the




64. See Rosenthal, Legal and Political Considerations of the United States' Ratification of
the Genocide Convention, 3 ANTIOCH L.J. 117, 122-24, 142 (1985). Rosenthal suggests that
anti-Sovietism was one of the three main "doctrinal rationales" embraced by opponents of
ratification, the two others being anti-globalism and neo-positivism. Id. at 118-19, 133-42.
65. See supra text accompanying note 40.
66. See generally A. DALLIN, THE SOVIET UNION AT THE UNITED NATIONS (1962).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
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Convention is that the international criminal court provision of Article
VI has been exceedingly controversial, stimulating disagreement reminis-
cent of the Brickerism of the 1950s. 68 This disagreement over the crimi-
nal court culminated in the insertion of an "understanding" in the
Lugar-Helms-Hatch Sovereignty Package that states in part that "the
United States declares that it reserves the right to effect its participation
in any such tribunal only by a treaty entered into specifically for that
purpose with the advice and consent of the Senate."' 69 It must be empha-
sized that in 1948 the Soviet bloc in the United Nations consisted of only
five out of a total of fifty-nine states (the Byelorussian SSR, the Ukrain-
ian SSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union itself), and only
six if Yugoslavia is included. This alone renders absurd the preoccupa-
tion of so many of the Convention's critics with the Soviet delegation's
position on the issue of political groups. In fact, the United States was
very ably represented during the negotiations. Table III presents some
evidence in support of this point.
Table 11170
Support for US and Soviet Positions on the Genocide Convention
(Coincidence of Yes/No on all roll call votes)
United States
Country % Agreement (Votes) Country
Soviet Union
% Agreement (Votes)
Canada 100.0% (15) Ukrainian SSR 100.0 (15)
New Zealand 93.3 (14) Byelorussian SSR 100.0 (15)
Netherlands 86.7 (13) Czechoslovakia 93.3 (14)
Brazil 80.0 (12) Yugoslavia 93.3 (14)
Chile 80.0 (12) Poland 86.7 (13)
United Kingdom 80.0 (12) Venezuela 46.7 (7)
Uruguay 73.3 (11) France 46.7 (7)
Belgium 73.3 (11) Norway 40.0 (6)
Luxembourg 73.3 (11) Argentina 33.3 (5)
Denmark 73.3 (11) Denmark 33.3 (5)
India 73.3 (11) Iran 33.3 (5)
68. Senator John W. Bricker (R. Oh.) was very active during the early 1950s in opposition
to U.S. ratification of human rights instruments, including the Genocide Convention. His
concern that presidents would urge ratification of such instruments led him to propose a con-
stitutional amendment limiting the use of the treaty-making power in this area. The concerns
raised by Bricker and his proposed amendment helped push the Eisenhower administration to
retreat from the activism of the Truman administration in the field of human rights. See gener-
ally V. VAN DYKE, HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD COMMUNITY 129-41
(1970).
69. 132 CONG. REc. S1378 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986).
70. The source of the data for Table III is the same as Table I. See supra note 32. The
number of votes in which each country coincided with either the Soviet Union or the United
States is shown in parentheses. Percentages may add to over 100% in some cases, because the
Soviet Union and the United States each abstained or did not vote on two of the seventeen roll
call votes. Thus, a country could have a 100% coincidence with U.S. votes while agreeing

































































































































































































The data in Table III show the coincidence of agreement of all the
members of the United Nations at the time the Convention was drafted
with the U.S. and Soviet positions. Only roll call votes taken in the Sixth
Committee were used in making the calculations; few votes were taken in
the plenary session of the General Assembly when the Convention was
adopted, and those taken upheld decisions reached earlier in committee.
Moreover, only the coincidence of agreement on yes/no votes was taken
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into account. This method reduces the distortions that might otherwise
occur if abstentions were included. A yes or no vote suggests stronger
feelings on an issue than does an abstention. In addition, states might
abstain for widely differing reasons; their coincidence in so voting would
therefore tell us very little.
In all, seventeen roll call votes were taken in the Sixth Committee. In
other votes, where no roll call was taken, an examination of the debate
records suggests that the U.S. delegation managed as well as, if not better
than, the data based on the roll call votes presented in Table III suggest.
Nonetheless, the data presented in the table enable us to reach conclu-
sions that are less impressionistic than conclusions based solely on the
summary records. In addition, yes/no votes allow generalization about
the extent of "support" for the U.S. and Soviet positions respectively,
and the sources of that support. As Table III shows, the U.S. positions
enjoyed substantial support across a broad spectrum of states. In fact,
twenty-nine of fifty-seven member states supported the U.S. position
more than fifty percent of the time. An additional group of nine states
had relatively high support scores, ranging from 46.7 percent (Vene-
zuela) to 33.3 percent (Saudi Arabia).
In marked contrast, as Table III demonstrates, the Soviet Union en-
joyed very little support among most states. In fact, only five states
agreed with the Soviet Union on more than half of the issues. The table
indicates a sharp and rapid decline in support for the Soviet positions
after the very high scores of the Soviet bloc are taken into account.
Although a high support score for either the United States or the Soviet
Union often translated into a low support score for the other, there were
states that apparently exercised considerable independence in their vot-
ing behavior. For example, France's support scores for the U.S. and So-
viet positions are identical at 46.7 percent.
B. The Perception of a Loophole
The second major argument of opponents to ratification has concerned
a perceived loophole in the Convention's definition of genocide. This ar-
gument, like the criticism of U.S. leadership in the negotiations, reflects a
preoccupation with the Soviet Union. The critics argue that the deletion
of political groups from Article II made the Convention inapplicable pre-
cisely where it should be applicable-that is, to the treatment that totali-
tarian governments mete out to political opponents. Thus, the critics
contend, the Soviet Union could commit genocide against any of the
groups in Article II while claiming that the acts were not genocidal be-




stroy a specific group or groups. It was the deletion of the word
"political" from Article II, according to the critics, that made this eva-
sion of charges of genocide possible.71 This argument was made by ABA
representatives and others during Senate hearings in 1950 and in the
1970s, and it continued to be expressed by some critics even after the
ABA changed its position in 1976, declaring itself in favor of the
Convention.
72
The text of the recently adopted sense of the Senate resolution on polit-
ical groups suggests that this argument had a tremendous impact on the
Senate. The resolution's preambular clauses state that the Senate finds
"that politically motivated genocide is being carried out in Afghanistan"
and "that instances of political genocide have occurred in Tibet and
Cambodia. ' 73 President Reagan, too, views an amendment as a way of
dealing with "politically motivated" genocide by totalitarian states.
74
Such an amendment, however, may be politically infeasible. According
to Article XVI of the Convention, U.N. action is required to amend the
Convention. 75 Amending a multilateral convention, especially one such
as the Genocide Convention that has already been ratified by about one
hundred states, would probably be impossible. One U.N. study during
the 1970s showed that most states felt that their main objective should be
to enforce the Convention as it is rather than to amend it to expand its
coverage.
76
The difficulty of amending a widely ratified multilateral convention is
not the only consideration that should be weighed in assessing the U.S.
71. See 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 54-55.
72. See, e.g., testimony of Maud-Ellen Zimmerman, Chairman of Voters Interest League,
in 1977 Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 86-89. The Liberty Lobby was especially outspo-
ken. See 1981 Senate Hearings, supra note 45, at 78-111.
73. 132 CONG. REc. S1380 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986).
74. Id. at S1379.
75. Article XVI of the Genocide Convention, 78 U.N.T.S. at 286, states:
A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any
Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-Gen-
eral.... The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect
of such request.
76. See COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 114-17. At the time the reso-
lution of ratification was passed, some senators were nonetheless optimistic about the possibil-
ity of amending the Convention in the United Nations, and they therefore pressed for the
adoption of the sense of the Senate resolution that calls for such an amendment. Senator
Richard Lugar, for example, did not think that pressing for an amendment after ratification
would "be an empty gesture." He noted that in August 1985, the matter had been discussed in
the Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities of
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. 132 CONG. REC. S1254 (daily ed. Feb 18, 1986).
Although the Soviet delegate had succeeded in having action on the matter deferred, Senator
Lugar thought it might be possible to resurrect the issue with the help of other Western states.
Id.
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strategy concerning political groups. It may even be argued that such
considerations should be secondary: that if an amendment of Article II
is worth pursuing, it should be pursued regardless of the possible political
difficulties. But is such an amendment necessary to achieve the objectives
of the Convention's critics? That is, is an amendment necessary to pre-
vent the evasion of charges of genocide? And even if amendment is not
necessary to meet the concerns of the critics, are there other reasons that
would make it desirable?
C. Is An Amendment Necessary To Stop Politically Motivated
Genocide?
The often expressed concern that the Convention does not cover politi-
cally motivated genocide reflects a curious and probably erroneous inter-
pretation of Article II, and more broadly, of the Convention as a whole.
The critics are preoccupied with motives. They fear, for example, the
destruction of a given group (other than a political party) on the grounds
of the group's political beliefs. According to Article II, however, geno-
cide is the commission of certain acts "with the intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such."
Neither Article II nor any other article of the Convention refers to the
motives that must lie behind the commission of such acts. It is true that
when the Convention was drafted, some consideration was given to speci-
fying motives. Article II of the draft convention prepared by the Ad Hoe
Committee contained specific references to motives-the destruction of
national, racial, religious, and political groups on grounds of their na-
tional or racial origins, religious beliefs, or political opinions. However,
these very precise references to motives were unacceptable to most repre-
sentatives in the Sixth Committee, and they were deleted from the article.
The representative of the United Kingdom offered the most trenchant
criticisms, suggesting that the references to motives should be deleted
because they were "useless" and "dangerous": useless because Article II
already included the notion of intent as a component of the crime of
genocide, and dangerous because the terms of the draft had the effect of
narrowing the grounds for charges of genocide.77 According to the U.K.
representative, requiring proof of motive might allow states to claim that
vicious acts aimed at, say, religious groups had been committed on
grounds other than the religious beliefs of the group. In such a situation,
no charge of genocide could be made.78 Other representatives in the
77. 3 U.N. GAOR C.6 (75th mtg.) at 118, U.N. Doc. A/633 (1948).




Sixth Committee agreed. The U.S. representative, for example, argued
that the "fundamental aim" of Article II was to "define the crime in
terms of intention, as was normally done in national legislation," and
that to "include motives in that definition would lead to ambiguity. '79
While a few representatives argued in favor of retaining the references to
motives, the Sixth Committee ultimately decided to delete them and to
insert the words "as such" in their place.80
In retrospect, there was more to be said for deleting the references to
motives than for retaining them, precisely for the reasons advanced by
the U.K. and U.S. representatives. The words "as such" in Article II
have the effect of referring back to the groups as entities. Commentators
on the Convention have generally agreed that any of the acts stipulated
in Article II committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
one of the groups specified would constitute genocide. 81 Put another
way, no one could "plead that the deed was done for reasons other than
those to be found in the constituent characteristics of the group," for the
words "as such" "indicate that the essential element of the crime is the
intentional attack against the existence of a group of human beings."
82
According to this interpretation of Article II, the reasons that national,
ethnic, racial or religious groups become victims of genocidal acts are
irrelevant. It does not matter whether they become victims for political,
economic, or other reasons; it matters only that they become victims.
Thus, notwithstanding the critics' fears, a state would not be able to
avoid charges of genocide by claiming that the motives that lay behind its
acts against, say, a national group were solely political.
8 3
This interpretation of Article II does not make proving charges of ge-
nocide easy. Instead, it calls attention to a different, and equally vexing
problem in interpreting and applying the Convention: proving the intent
to destroy a group or groups. Disputes concerning intention, or the lack
79. Id. at 124.
80. Id. at 124-25, 133.
81. See N. ROBINSON, supra note 8, at 58.
82. P. DROST, THE CRIME OF STATE: GENOCIDE 83 (1959).
83. It should be noted that the representatives of various ethnic groups in the United
States that have closely followed the Convention debates--e.g., Ukrainians, Armenians, and
Greeks-have never considered the deletion of political groups from Article II to affect ad-
versely the application of the Convention, as many of its critics have thought it did. To the
contrary, they have supported ratification of the Convention as a way of bringing pressure to
bear on the Soviet Union for its allegedly genocidal practices. The Ukrainian Congress Com-
mittee of America, for example, strongly supported ratification in 1950 and in the 1970s. See
1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 42, at 165-74. Such groups are likely to support initiatives
like that of Senator Robert Byrd, who introduced a concurrent resolution in the Senate in June
1986 calling upon the U.S. Secretary of State to examine whether Soviet action in Afghanistan
violated the Convention, which the Soviet Union has ratified. See 132 CONG. REC. S7919-21
(daily ed. June 19, 1986).
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thereof, have already figured prominently in some recent allegations of
genocide, such as those concerning the war waged by the United States in
Vietnam and the treatment of Ach6 Indians in Paraguay. United States
government officials, of course, never admitted a genocidal intent in the
conduct of the Vietnam War, and there has been much disagreement on
the issue.8 4 The Paraguayan government has also claimed a lack of in-
tent in the case of the Ach6 Indians as a defense to charges of genocide.8 5
Both alleged episodes stand in sharp contrast to the two cases that are
usually regarded as the modern paradigms of genocide-the Nazi effort
to exterminate the Jews and other groups during World War II, and the
Turkish effort to exterminate the Armenians during World War I. In
both cases the perpetrators' intentions were clear.86 Despite difficulties
in proving intent, the Convention as written protects racial, ethnic, na-
tional and religious groups from genocidal acts where the perpetrator
claims only a political motive.
D. Is An Amendment Otherwise Desirable?
Even if the deletion of the word "political" from Article II did not
create the loophole regarding motives that critics of the Convention al-
lege, an amendment of the article to cover political groups could still be
considered desirable in order to outlaw large-scale political persecution.
As a result of the drafters' exclusion of political groups it appears that
the Convention does not apply to situations in which genocide-like acts,
including mass slaughter, are committed, but the national, ethnic, racial,
or religious identity of the victims is not at issue. For example, the atroc-
ities committed in Kampuchea after the fall of the Lon Nol government
in 1975 may not constitute genocide under the terms of the Convention.
Hundreds of thousands died, but it could be argued that the slaughter
was not directed at specific groups on the grounds of their national, eth-
nic, racial, or religious identity. The Kampuchean situation has evoked
strong feelings, and despite the apparently political nature of the acts,
efforts are now underway by a nongovernmental organization-the Cam-
84. There is a vast body of literature on this issue. See, e.g., AGAINST THE CRIME OF
SILENCE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL (. Duffett ed.
1970); Bedau, Genocide in Vietnam?, in PHILOSOPHY, MORALITY AND INTERNATIONAL AF-
FAIRS 46 (V. Held et. al. eds. 1974); Falk, Ecocide, Genocide, and the Nuremburg Tradition of
Individual Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHY, MORALITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra,
at 123; J.P. SARTRE, ON GENOCIDE 57-79 (1968); Bassiouni, International Law and the Holo-
caust, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 202, 274-75 (1979); G. LEWY, AMERICA IN VIETNAM 301-04
(1978).
85. GENOCIDE IN PARAGUAY 15, 141 (R. Arens ed. 1976).
86. See L. KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS POLITICAL USES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY




bodia Documentation Commission-to persuade a party to the Conven-
tion to bring charges of genocide to the ICJ against the government of
Democratic Kampuchea, which ratified the Convention in 1950 as
Cambodia.
8 7
Questions have also been raised about whether the atrocities commit-
ted in Uganda during the reign of Idi Amin during the 1970s and in the
Soviet Union during the Stalinist purges of the 1930s would constitute
genocide under the Convention. In brief, widespread slaughter of popu-
lations can occur and apparently not be covered by the Convention. 8 As
one scholar has observed, the Convention does not "outlaw all forms of
barbarism." 9
To many persons, scholars and non-scholars alike, the inapplicability
of the Convention to situations such as these is deeply disturbing, reflect-
ing a serious weakness in the Convention's definition of genocide-a
weakness that would not exist had political groups been included in Arti-
cle II. The one characteristic the victims appeared to share in these situ-
ations is that they were thought to be enemies of the state, or perhaps of a
particular political leader or group of leaders. What is important is not
the nature of the groups but that they became victims, and the horror
and magnitude of the crimes make the temptation great to extend protec-
tion to all such varied groups.
While the liquidation of political groups is certainly deplorable, it is
nonetheless unwise and impractical to provide such groups protection
under the Convention. Most scholars and politicians who have consid-
ered the question agree that violence against political groups may, in
some circumstances, be legitimate. Kurt Glaser and Stefan Possony, for
example, who feel that political groups should have been included in Ar-
ticle II, recognize that "some groups may very well be hostile and
threaten the security of the state, in which case the threatened state
should be allowed to protect itself, albeit by nongenocidal means." 90 Leo
Kuper argues that the concept of genocide should not apply to certain
87. See Kampuchea, 166 HUM. RTS. INTERNET REP., nos. 5-6 (1987).
88. See L. KUPER, supra note 86, at 138-60; L. KUPER, THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE
126-47 (1985); J. BARRON & A. PAUL, MURDER OF A GENTLE LAND: THE UNTOLD STORY
OF COMMUNIST GENOCIDE IN CAMBODIA (1977); R. FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE
SOVEREIGNTY 15976 (1981); Hawk, Pol Pot's Cambodia: Was it Genocide?, in TOWARD THE
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE 51-59 (I. Charny ed. 1982); Wangyal,
Tibet: A Case of Eradicating Religion Leading to Genocide, in TOWARD THE UNDERSTAND-
ING AND PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE, supra, at 119-26; AMNESTY INT'L, POLITICAL KILL-
INGS BY GOVERNMENTS (1983).
89. Edwards, Contributions of the Genocide Convention to the Development of International
Law, 8 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 300, 302 (1981).
90. K. GLASER & S. POSSONY, VICTIMS OF POLITICS 39 (1979).
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situations "which have some affinity with genocide, such as the large-
scale slaughter of hostages taken from the opposing group, or the shoot-
ing down or bombing of passenger planes, or the striking at the soft un-
derbelly of England by bombs in underground trains or subways." 91
And as Senator Christopher Dodd explained,
Not all political violence is illegal or immoral. There is simply no way to
distinguish in legal terms between what may qualify for some as political
genocide and what may be regarded as legitimate violence, for instance, a
bitter and bloody fight by a subjugated people for its freedom. The use of
this elusive concept would do nothing but provide ammunition for endless
propaganda battles that we already have enough of. Opponents of the Ge-
nocide Convention never ceased to worry about American citizens who
served in our military in Vietnam who may be accused of genocide as a
result of their service. This was, of course, absurd. We were taking part in
an armed political conflict, and were not trying to kill all Vietnamese, or all
Buddhists, or any other objectively identifiable group.
We, however, could arguably be accused of having tried to kill all Com-
munists, or at least all Vietcongs. This is the essence of war, ugly as it is.
Do the champions of the concept of political genocide really want to expose
our ex-servicemen to the charge of political genocide on this account? How
about the Afghan freedom-fighters who certainly try to kill all who belong
to the occupying Soviet powers and who are allied with them? Do the
sponsors of this resolution really want to say they are committing political
genocide? My point is, that the Genocide Convention omitted political
groups from its definition with good reasons. The reason was not to excuse
extreme political violence. The reason was to give a clear and objective
definition, to try to raise a well defined international standard that every
nation can endorse, even if that endorsement is often hypocritical. 92
These observations lead to a number of questions: Is it possible to
come up with a widely accepted definitional distinction between political
genocide and acceptable attacks against political groups? Where does
one draw the line between appropriate and forbidden political violence?
If the Convention is amended to include political groups among those it
aims to protect, how should such groups be defined by member states
and how would this provision be applied?
Some have attempted to begin answering these questions. The U.S.
representative to the United Nations at the time of the drafting of the
Convention suggested that a political party provided a good example of a
political group. While this might be true, it is only one example. To
confine the meaning of political groups to political parties would be un-
duly narrow and vague. Groups and movements of various sizes, as well
91. L. KUPER, supra note 86, at 138.




as individuals, commonly claim to be political in nature and to be perse-
cuted for political reasons. Consider, for example, the groups of war
protesters who were tried for various crimes during the Vietnam War-
groups who claimed they were being attacked by the government because
of their political views. While this claim might be questionable, it points
to the difficulty inherent in selecting criteria for determining what consti-
tutes a political group. One possible criterion is the number of victims
involved, but it is unclear why this factor should be given much weight.
The case of Ach6 Indians suggests that genocide can be perpetrated
against small groups as well as large ones. This group of primitive peo-
ple, when confronted by those seeking its destruction, behaved in the
same way as victims of the much larger Nazi genocidal plan. The Ach6
demonstrated a loss of self-respect, a loss of the will to live, and even, in
some cases, a perverse identification with those trying to destroy them.
93
Political groups thus present problems of a sort that national, ethnic,
racial, and religious groups do not. Consideration of these problems
leads to a recognition of the wisdom of the Convention's drafters in delet-
ing the reference to political groups from Article II. It does not appear
possible to develop an acceptable definition of what constitutes a political
group for purposes of the Genocide Convention; exceptions to any pro-
posed definition come readily to mind. Yet who would argue that excep-
tions should be made in the more prominent cases of genocide-the
wholesale slaughtering of Jews, Armenians, or the Ach6? The Conven-
tion was obviously designed to deal with such cases, and only such
cases. 9
4
Is there any way out of this dilemma? Jordan Paust has suggested
that, "[t]o the extent that violations of relevant human rights are crimi-
nally sanctioned, any gap in coverage by the Genocide Convention [of
political groups] will prove to be of little import." 95 Paust nonetheless
believes that "it may be important to emphasize these recognitions in a
new international instrument, if only to further sanctify criminal pro-
scription and to provide additional guidance concerning the contours of
present prohibitions. ' 96 In this connection he has proposed a draft con-
vention on the prevention and punishment of the "Crime of Politicide."
Paust's draft is analogous to the Genocide Convention, though it con-
tains provisions that some might consider to be an improvement. For
93. See Munzel, Manhunt, in GENOCIDE IN PARAGUAY, supra note 85 at 19-45.
94. See Edwards, supra note 89, at 302.
95. Paust, Aggression Against Authority: The Crime of Oppression, Politicide and Other
Crimes Against Human Rights, 18 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 294, 294 (1986).
96. Id.
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example, it expressly recognizes the principle of universal jurisdiction to
try persons accused of politicide and related crimes. 97 While a full analy-
sis of Paust's proposal is beyond the scope of this article, his ideas are
worthy of further exploration.
Conclusion
The decision made by the drafters of the Convention to exclude polit-
ical groups from protection was based on two considerations. First, in
determining which types of groups to protect, the drafters employed the
criterion of stability: whether the groups were ones that persons tend to
be born into or that tend to maintain their identities over relatively long
periods of time. National, ethnic, racial, and religious groups qualified
under this standard. Political groups did not. Second, some drafters
were concerned that the inclusion of political groups in Article II would
create an obstacle to its ratification by many states that were apprehen-
sive that they would be charged with genocide of subversive groups they
were attempting to suppress.
The possibility that such allegations might be made was perceived to
be even more troublesome in light of the fact that the Convention was to
contain a provision relating to the creation of an international criminal
court. In the end, most drafters of the Convention who favored the in-
clusion of political groups in Article II were persuaded to accept the de-
letion of the political groups clause in order to eliminate this obstacle to
its ratification.
The deletion had the reverse of its intended effect in the United States.
The Senate debated, albeit sporadically, the question of whether or not
the Convention should be ratified by the United States for almost forty
years. Throughout these decades of Senate debate, the Convention's fail-
ure to extend protection to political groups as such was seized upon by
numerous critics as a major reason why the United States should not
ratify it. Two principal arguments were made. One condemned the inef-
fective leadership of the United States in the negotiations, and its sup-
posed capitulation to Soviet demands. The other asserted the existence
of a loophole in the Convention's definition of genocide because of its
failure to mention political groups as possible victims of genocide. The
strong sentiments expressed on these issues spurred the Senate to adopt a
sense of the Senate resolution along with its resolution of ratification in
February 1986, calling upon the President and the Permanent Represen-
tative of the United States to the United Nations to propose an amend-




ment of the Convention to extend coverage to political groups. As we
have seen, however, the first argument misrepresents what actually oc-
curred during the negotiations when the Convention was drafted. The
second misinterprets the Convention by introducing questions of motive
into Article II which are irrelevant to a finding that genocide has been
committed.
Scholars call attention to a different problem that could arise in apply-
ing the Convention. The Convention seems not to apply to situations in
which genocide-like acts have occurred but the national, ethnic, racial, or
religious identity of the victims is not at issue. Yet including political
groups in the Convention's definition of genocide would raise different
problems, such as how to define political groups and how to deal with
situations in which political violence might not be considered morally
repugnant. Thus it is best not to pursue an amendment of the Conven-
tion, but rather to attempt to deal with the problem of political violence
through other means.
